Robin Dorff joined the Strategic Studies Institute in June 2007 as Research Professor of National Security Affairs. He previously served on the USAWC faculty as a Visiting Professor (1994-96) and as Professor of National Security Policy and Strategy in the Department of National Security and Strategy (1997-2004), where he also held the General Maxwell D. Taylor Chair (1999-2002) and served as Department Chairman (2001-2004). Dr. Dorff has been a Senior Advisor with Creative Associates International, Inc., in Washington, DC, and served as Executive Director of the Institute of Political Leadership in Raleigh, NC (2004-2006). Dr. Dorff remains extensively involved in strategic leadership development, focusing on national security strategy and policy, and strategy formulation. His research interests include these topics as well as failing and fragile states, interagency processes and policy formulation, stabilization and reconstruction operations, and US grand strategy. He lectures frequently on these topics and has spoken all over the U.S. and in Canada, Europe, Africa, and Asia, and at institutions such as the Africa Center for Strategic Studies, the Near East-South Asia Center for Strategic Studies, the George C. Marshall Center, the Marine Corps University, the Joint Special Operations School, the National Defense University of Taiwan, and the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies in Singapore. He is the author or co-author of three books and numerous journal articles. Dr. Dorff is the recipient of the U.S. Army Superior Civilian Service Award and the U.S. Army Outstanding Civilian Service Medal, and seven US Army War College Faculty Published Writing Awards (1996-2001, 2004). Professor Dorff holds a B.A. in Political Science from Colorado College and an M.A. and Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill.
DEVELOPMENT IS DESTRUCTION, AND OTHER THINGS YOU WEREN'T TOLD AT SCHOOL
"Development" is a multi-billion dollar industry with two objectives: a humanitarian objective, to reduce misery from poverty and lack of modern practices, policies, and technology in those sectors of humanity who currently have not achieved the Millennium Development Goals; and a security objective: to reduce security threats by the 'have-nots' against the 'haves'. As such, development can be seen as one tool in military efforts at post-war stabilization, notably in asymmetric conflicts such as e.g. Afghanistan and Iraq.
However, I argue in this paper, there is a misunderstanding about some of the fundamentalfeatures of development. Analytically, 'development' as it is conceived of in the West (the primary agent of development) starts with the systematic, intentional, and irreversible destruction of many features of the to-be-developed society and economy. I demonstrate this argument by reference to both examples and analytical structures.
Much of the opposition to Western development, including, inter alia that of Afghans, for example derives from a (possibly unconscious) recognition by the actors, that their social realities are under threat by development.; The Islamist tinge of this resistance is, in this view a useful rallying cry. In practice, a major cause of resistance is participants' recognition that development threatens fundamental destruction of their society and way of life: in effect, the substance of their resistance is often a recognition of, and a resistance to, real social threats. In non-Islamic countries, resistance can take other forms, but the principled objections are similar.
Recognizing the destructive potential of development is useful in achieving both the humanitarian and the security objectives. Certainly recruiting local government agents who in their personal roles understand what they are destroying, creates an ambiguity that needs to be resolved. Therefore, finally, I address some of the issues of how to approach the dissonance between government agents acting in their professional and in their personal roles. This includes the question of whether, and what types of development activities, in what conditions present more of a post-war credit than debit.
Mary Habeck is an Associate Professor in Strategic Studies at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), where she teaches courses on military history and strategic thought. Before coming to SAIS, Dr. Habeck taught American and European military history in Yale's history department, 1994-2005. She received her PhD in history from Yale in 1996, an MA in international relations from Yale in 1989, and a BA in international studies, Russian, and Spanish from Ohio State in 1987.
Dr Habeck was appointed by President Bush to the Council on the Humanities at the National Endowment for the Humanities (2006-2012), and in 2008-2009 she was the Special Advisor for Strategic Planning on the National Security Council staff.
In addition to books and articles on doctrine, World War I, the Spanish Civil War, and al-Qa'ida, her publications include Knowing the Enemy: Jihadist Ideology and the War on Terror (Yale, 2005) and two forthcoming sequels, Attacking America: How Salafi Jihadis Are Fighting Their 200-Year War with the U.S. (2011) and Fighting the Enemy: The U.S. and its War against the Salafi Jihadis (2013).
The thorny issue of whole of government planning is made even more problematic by the new security environment that confronts the U.S. government. The first stumbling block is that the concept of planning is understood in quite different ways by the multiple agencies that make up the U.S. national security community. In addition, that the Department of Defense has a clearly delineated vision for planning suggests that there might be a tendency to adopt DoD definitions and processes without consideration for the flexibility that any whole of government answer will demand.
Beyond defining what is meant by the term, the design and implementation of a comprehensive solution for better planning presents a second series of challenges that are made more difficult by the need to simultaneously fight two hot wars and engage the complex global threat of al-Qa'ida, while preparing to fight a potential conventional war.
A close examination of the conjoined issues of planning and the new security environment, with particular attention to the need to confront the evolving challenge of al-Qa'ida, highlights the particular problems that must be addressed, while suggesting some ways to provide better strategic guidance for fighting any global conflict against non-state actors.
A former senior government official, Bob Kennedy returned to his position as Professor in the Sam Nunn School of International Affairs, Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, Georgia in January 2003 after serving as director of the joint German-American George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies in Germany. In nearly 35 years of government service, Bob has also served as Civilian Deputy Commandant, NATO Defense College, Rome, Italy; Dwight D. Eisenhower Professor of National Security Studies at the U.S. Army War College, researcher at the U.S. Army Strategic Studies Institute, Foreign Affairs Officer, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency; and an enlisted man in the Army and a command pilot on active duty with the U.S. Air Force and later with the reserve forces. His most recent works are Of Knowledge and Power: the Complexities of National Intelligence (2008), "The Elements of Strategic Thinking" in Gabriel Marcella, ed. Teaching Strategy: Challenge and Response (2010) and The Road to War: Congress' Historic Abdication of Responsibility (2010).
Today the United States is faced with a multiplicity of threats and challenges, none of which is as perilous or potentially as deadly as the Cold War confrontation between two powers. Nonetheless, some of the problems pose potentially dangerous consequences for the United States, its allies and friends, and indeed others. However, for the most part, they flow not "from the strength of determined opponents," but often "from the weaknesses of other states." To be sure, the United States must guard against the rise of a potentially hostile military peer competitor, as well as be prepared to protect its interests and those of its allies. The United States also must address such difficult security challenges a nuclear North Korea or the further proliferation of nuclear weapons, for example in Iran. Nor can the United States ignore the potentially damaging compounding effects to U.S. security operations of cyber and other technologies increasing available on a global scale.
However, fragile, fractured, and failing states are likely to remain among the more serious security challenges. Such states can provide a breeding ground and safe haven for crime, drug and human trafficking, ethnic, religious, and tribal strife, and violet extremist groups. They also can destabilize an entire region, making wider conflicts more probable. Weapons of mass destruction, especially nuclear devices, in the hands of terrorist or criminal groups can have catastrophic consequences. Thus, precluding instabilities and mitigating and managing conflicts, particularly in fragile, fractured, or failing states, but also elsewhere, are among the major security challenges confronting the United States.
In the last few years there has been a growing recognition that to confront such threats to its security, the United States must take a "whole of government" approach, bringing to bear in an integrated fashion the efforts of multiple agencies to manage and resolve crises and conflicts. However, in integrating the efforts of the various agencies, the U.S. government will need to first address a number of important, indeed critical, questions if it is to fashion successful approaches to address the challenges ahead.
Michael Miklaucic is the Director of Research, Information and Publications at the Center for Complex Operations (CCO) at National Defense University. He is also the Editor of PRISM; the journal of CCO. Prior to this assignment he served in various positions at the U.S. Agency for International Development and the Department of State, including USAID representative on the Civilian Response Corps Inter-Agency Task Force, as the Senior Program Officer in the USAID Office of Democracy and Governance, and Rule of Law Specialist in the Center for Democracy and Governance. In 2002-2003 he served as the Department of State Deputy for War Crimes Issues. His university education is from the University of California, the London School of Economics, and the School for Advanced International Studies. He is an adjunct professor of U.S. Foreign Policy at American University, and of Conflict and Development at George Mason University.
Dr. Lisa Schirch is the founding director of the 3D Security Initiative and a professor of peacebuilding at Eastern Mennonite University's graduate Center for Justice & Peacebuilding. The 3D Security Initiative is a policy voice for civil society to foster peacebuilding through more extensive diplomatic initiatives, smarter development strategies, and human security-oriented defense strategies. This is done by connecting policymakers with global civil society networks, facilitating civil-military dialogue and providing a peacebuilding lens on current policy issues.
A former Fulbright Fellow in East and West Africa, Schirch has worked in Afghanistan, Lebanon, Iraq, Taiwan, Ghana, Kenya, Brazil, and 15 other countries. Schirch is the author of 5 books on peacebuilding and conflict prevention. The US Institute of Peace plans to publish her latest book, The Role of the Media in Peacebuilding. Schirch holds a B.A. in International Relations from the University of Waterloo, Canada, and a M.S. and Ph.D. in Conflict Analysis and Resolution from George Mason University. She is a frequent public speaker and has TV and radio experience discussing U.S. foreign policy.
There are many different types of civil-military relationships. Civilian government, civilian contractors, civil society organizations and the civilian public are very different kinds of "civilians." There are also diverse types of military actors operating in contexts like Afghanistan or Colombia. The intense challenges of coordinating government civilians with international military actors and the increasing military use of civilian contractors confuses and overshadows the distinct nature of civil society-military relationships sharing space in conflict-affected regions. While a number of civil-military guidelines exist to clarify humanitarian NGOs and military interaction, guidance for development and peacebuilding contexts that go beyond humanitarian relief is missing. The UN defines Humanitarian Civil Military Coordination as "The essential dialogue and interaction between civilian and military actors in humanitarian emergencies that is necessary to protect and promote humanitarian principles, avoid competition, minimize inconsistency and when appropriate pursue common goals. Basic strategies range from coexistence to cooperation. Coordination is a shared responsibility facilitated by liaison and common training." This definition holds true for contexts that involve ongoing complex political conflicts as well, except for one important distinction. In many humanitarian crises, such as the earthquake in Haiti or the tsunami in Asia, all actors more or less agree on the humanitarian mission. In ongoing crises in Afghanistan, Iraq or Colombia, civil society and international forces, including the US government and military, may fundamentally disagree on the mission definition. Due to conflicting interests and perceptions, the level of conflict between civil society organizations and diverse military actors is increasing. Civil society organizations perceive development efforts by military actors is not in line with UN CIMIC Policy for military "to support creating an enabling environment ... maximizing the comparative advantage of all actors operating in the mission area." Military actors perceive that civil society organizations are unwilling to work with them to be part of the solution in a shared mission. When alone, both sides use pejorative terms and stereotypes about the other group. This paper will map the tensions dividing civil society organizations and military actors and then lay out possible options to address these tensions via principled negotiation.
Dr. Fouzieh Melanie Alamir, born in 1966 in Teheran/Iran, is currently appointed as a Program Manager for the business field "Comprehensive Security" with IABG, a private technology and consulting company with focus on security and defence. After having worked as a lecturer at the Federal University of the German Armed Forces and the Staff and Command College of the German Armed Forces from 1997-2002, she joined the politico-military branch in the Federal Ministry of Defence in 2002. With her next employment at the German Agency for Technical Co-operation she worked at the interface between security and development policy with a focus on the issue security system reform from 2004-2006. In her current position, she has been working as a senior political consultant for various governmental agencies, among them the German Foreign Office, the Federal Ministry of the Interior, the Federal Ministry of Defence and Armed Forces as well as several other emergency response and development agencies. On behalf of the German Foreign Office she was deployed as a Political Advisor to the Senior Civilian Representative of NATO at ISAF HQ, Kabul in 2006.
Besides longstanding experience as an academic researcher and lecturer, she has published numerous articles in books and scientific magazines. Her fields of expertise cover a broad range of security policy issues, European and Transatlantic Security. In recent years she has specialized on civil-military interfaces, aspects of comprehensive security, and interagency cooperation in national and international crisis management. She is familiar both with military and civilian approaches to crisis management at strategic, operational and tactical level.
Security System Reform in Weak or Fragile States Implemented Through a Whole of Government Approach: A Threefold Challenge
From a development policy perspective, the notion whole of government comprises three dimensions which require separate consideration as they touch upon three completely different policy arenas:
The challenges of adapting a whole of government approach differ considerably in these three policy arenas and hence require specific coping strategies.
The presentation and subsequent paper will analyze the particular challenges in each arena, discuss the risks of not adhering to the whole of government principles, and will reflect on the consequences for conflict management. The author will focus on reforms of the security system in weak and fragile states as a practical reference area. Security system reform is a concept that incorporates the demand for a whole of government approach as an integral element of its programmatic philosophy. It is therefore highly suitable to demonstrate whole of government prospects and challenges.
Professor Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., is a Visiting Professor of the Practice at Duke Law School and the Associate Director of its Center on Law, Ethics and National Security. He is a retired Air Force major general who received his undergraduate degree from St. Joseph's University (PA), and his law degree from Villanova University. Prior to retiring from the military in June of 2010, General Dunlap assisted in the supervision of more than 2,500 military and civilian attorneys worldwide. His 34-year career included tours in both the United Kingdom and Korea, and he deployed for military operations in Africa and the Middle East. Totaling more than 120 publications, his writings address a wide range of topics including various aspects of national security law, airpower, counterinsurgency, cyberpower, civil-military relations, and leadership. A distinguished graduate of the National War College, General Dunlap speaks frequently at professional conferences and at numerous institutions of higher learning, to include Harvard, Yale, MIT, UVA, and Stanford, as well as National Defense University and the Air, Army, and Navy War Colleges. He serves on the Board of Advisors for the Center for a New American Security.
James "Spike" Stephenson, a retired Senior Foreign Service Officer with the U.S. Agency for International Development, is the Senior Advisor for Stabilization and Reconstruction at Creative Associates International, Inc. His last duties in USAID included thirteen months as Mission Director in Iraq, and service as a Senior Advisor to the State Department's Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization. He previously served as Mission Director in Serbia/Montenegro and Lebanon, and in various positions in Egypt, Barbados, Grenada, El Salvador, the Philippines and Washington. He frequently lectures at the military service colleges and various universities, and trains deploying units in counterinsurgency. The author of Losing the Golden Hour, he has also been published in various journals and quoted or acknowledged in military field manuals. Before joining USAID, Mr. Stephenson practiced law, in Columbia, South Carolina. He holds a Bachelor's honors degree in English Literature and a Juris Doctor from the University of South Carolina. A former army officer, he is a decorated veteran of the Viet Nam War.
Whole of Government in Diplomacy and Development. Whole or Hole?
December 15, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton finally released the first Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Report, or QDDR. While much of the attention of the international development community was focused on what role the QDDR would articulate for USAID, its embrace of the "whole of government" approach to diplomacy and development seemed to pass almost unnoticed. Arguably, this is because in the implementation of U.S. foreign assistance whole of government has grown like a fungus for over a decade. Since Operation Iraqi Freedom, it has become the modus operandi-whole of government on steroids-for U.S. efforts to bring stability in conflict, post-conflict and fragile states that may fall victim to conflict. As the QDDR states, ambassadors are now CEOs of complex interagency missions. Where USAID once had almost sole responsibility for foreign assistance, more than a dozen agencies and government organizations now have their own mini-foreign aid offices, all ostensibly under chief of mission authority or at least a "unified effort," the term used where the military is present and not under chief of mission authority. Further, the military has become ever more deeply engaged in stability operations that are indistinguishable from civilian stabilization and reconstruction efforts, even in theaters where there is no obvious need for a uniformed presence. Embassies are larger, with disparate agencies competing for foreign aid dollars, often working at cross-purposes. The proponents of whole of government embrace the logic that the application of more human and bureaucratic resources ipso facto results in the efficient production of a better product-that competition engenders rigor. But does it? Is there any empirical evidence that the vast bureaucracies we created in Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan are any more effective than the far smaller, flatter country teams we used in the past? Are domestic agencies really very good at foreign assistance and in foreign operating environments? Are ambassadors, by training and experience, prepared to be CEOs of "complex interagency missions?" Finally, with the imperative to cut deficits and the federal work force, does the QDDR, which calls for staff increases at State and USAID, offer a sustainable business model?
COL (Ret) Jack A. LeCuyer is currently a Distinguished Professor holding a Minerva Chair at the U.S. Army War College's Strategic Studies Institute in Carlisle, PA. He most recently has been a Distinguished Fellow with the Project on National Security Reform with lead responsibility for PNSR's efforts in design of the new National Security Staff, alignment of strategy and resources, and design of the Next Generation State Department. He was a major contributor to recent PNSR study efforts, including Forging a New Shield (November 2008), Turning Ideas into Action (September 2009) and the recently completed The Power of People: Building an Integrated National Security Professional System for the 21st Century (December 2010). COL LeCuyer has been a strategic planner and Special Assistant to the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, the Commander-in-Chief, United States Southern Command, and two Army Chiefs of Staff. He played a major role in the post-Vietnam transformation of the Army into today's world class organization.
COL LeCuyer has eight year's experience in post-conflict reconstruction and development of market economies and parliamentary systems in the Balkans, Eastern Europe and Iraq and twenty year's senior level leadership focused on strategic policy, organizational planning and effectiveness, doctrinal development, policy formulation, project advocacy and marketing, operational and fiscal management, and successful program execution. COL LeCuyer served as an Olmsted Scholar in Florence, Italy, White House Fellow with duty in the White Office of Intergovernmental Affairs, Army Fellow at the Atlantic Council of the United States, Senior Army Fellow at the Brookings Institution and Executive Director of the White House Fellows Foundation and Association. He is a licensed professional engineer and the recipient of the Army's Distinguished Service Medal (DSM), the Army's highest peacetime award.
Title: Transforming the National Security System
The President's National Security Strategy (May 2010) calls for more and better coordination across departments and agencies and education and training of our national security professionals to equip them to meet the challenges of the 21st century. The strategy notes that "To succeed, we must update, balance, and integrate all of the tools of American power."
However, the soaring rhetoric that calls for interagency integration of effort is remarkably short on details of how this transformation would be accomplished, perhaps in the belief that the reforms embodied in PSD-1 were sufficient. This research effort focuses on assessing additional steps required to achieve the transformation of our national security system to implement the President's National Security Strategy. A report card will be provided on efforts at the strategic level, where every national security issue is inherently interagency by definition, with an examination of the collaborative efforts in the interagency space between strongly defined departmental and agency interests and the Executive Office of the President. Of particular interest are the need for expanded roles of the newly created National Security Staff and the education and training of national security professionals who operate in the interagency space to meet our national security challenges in the global security environment of the 21st century.
Dr. Richard Vengroff, a political scientist specializing in comparative politics (Canada and Africa), comparative electoral systems, development administration and management, did his graduate work at the Maxwell School of Syracuse University. He is a recipient of the “Ordre National du Lion” (Senegal’s highest civilian honor) for his contributions to higher education and development in that country. Dr. Vengroff has lived and worked overseas for over eight of the last 30 years and has conducted field research and been involved in the design, implementation, and evaluation of development projects and numerous exchange and linkage programs around the world. He has recently served a two-year term as vice president of the American Council on Quebec Studies, and program Chair for the meetings in Charleston, South Carolina. He was the campus project Director for a FIPSE funded North American Mobility Grant (UConn, SUNY, U.Laval, Carleton, U of Monterey)), PI for the Canadian I-Poll Project of the Roper Center for Public Opinion Research and a participant in a USIS funded NAFTA faculty exchange research program (University of Calgary). Dr. Vengroff has participated in linkage projects in Estonia, Venezuela, Chile, and Hungary. He has also served as team leader and PI on numerous multi-million dollar AID funded projects in sub-Saharan Africa. He also served as a trustee of the Consortium for International Development based in Tucson.
Dr. Vengroff is also the author, or editor, of seven books, 90 articles and book chapters in scholarly journals and books, a series of widely used training materials in project management and a development simulation. His current research is devoted to issues of Canadian and Quebec politics, development management, democratic governance, decentralization, and privatization. He is the past editor for the American Society for Public Administration (ASPA) Comparative Administration Papers and book review editor for Representation and Electoral Systems.
Doug Brooks is President of ISOA, the International Stability Operations Association. ISOA is a nongovernmental, nonprofit, nonpartisan association of service companies dedicated to providing ethical services to international peacekeeping, peace enforcement, humanitarian rescue, stabilization efforts and disaster relief. Mr. Brooks is a specialist on private sector capabilities and African security issues and has written extensively on the regulation and constructive utilization of the private sector for international peacekeeping and humanitarian missions.
Mr. Brooks has testified before the U.S. Congress, South African Parliament and to UN functions. He has appeared on countless TV and radio programs including al Jazeera, the BBC, CBS News, NBC News, Fox News, CNN International, National Public Radio, the Diane Rehm show, Voice of America, SABC in South Africa and the Lehrer News Hour. He has lectured at numerous universities and colleges, including Georgetown University, the South African Defense College, the Inter-American Defense College at Ft. McNair, George C. Marshall Center in Garmisch, Germany and the U.S. Military Academy at West Point.
Mr. Brooks is originally from Indiana and has a BA in History from Indiana University and an MA in History from Baylor University, with additional doctoral studies at the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, University of Pittsburgh. He has worked as a teacher in Kambuzuma Township in Harare, Zimbabwe, at the Library of Congress, at the National Archives, and the Institute of International Education (IIE). Previous to founding IPOA he was an academic fellow at the South African Institute for International Affairs in 1999-2000
Ethical Lessons on Maximizing Private Contractor Value in Iraq and Afghanistan
This paper will evaluate the role of private contractors and their evolving role in Iraq and Afghanistan, particularly what can be learned from the relationship between the public and private sector. In re-evaluating this relationship, we hope to highlight areas in which both parties can enhance public stabilization policies and ensure ethical and professional contractor operations in contingency areas. Possibilities for a more effective partnership between public and private sector can be accessed through an examination of regulations developed during these operations, as well as an evaluation of how public perceptions of contractors influence the dynamics of the public-private relationship. By better understanding the areas in which tension occurred in the Iraq and Afghanistan contexts, directions for improvement in the implementation of the public-private partnership in contingency operations can be identified and developed.
Christopher Holshek, Colonel (retired), U.S. Army (Reserve) Civil Affairs, has 25 years of civil-military operations experience at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels in joint, interagency, and multinational settings across the full range of operations, among them command of the first CA battalion to deploy to Iraq in support of Army, Marine and British forces, as a KFOR CIMIC Liaison Officer to the UN Interim Mission in Kosovo, and in the planning and deployment of CA forces to the Balkans in the mid-1990s. Originally commissioned an armored cavalry officer, Col (ret.) Holshek deployed for 18 months as Senior U.S. Military Observer and Chief of Civil-Military Coordination (CIMIC) in the United Nations Mission in Liberia, where he broke new ground in applying and validating CIMIC concepts and later assisted in the development of UN civil-military policy and doctrine. His final tour of duty prior to retirement after 30 years was as the Military Representative at the U.S. Agency for International Development's Office of Military Affairs for USEUCOM/SHAPE, helping to link security and development at the national strategic level in an interagency setting as well as to stand up the National Response Center for the Haiti earthquake. Over the years, he has also had significant input to the development of policy and doctrine for NATO CIMIC, U.S. Army civil affairs, Joint civil-military operations, and UN-CIMIC, as well as stability operations doctrine, the Capstone Concept for Joint Operations, and the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review. He is a rare American who has served with the UN in military and civilian capacities (as a civilian, with the UN as a logistics officer with the UN Transitional Administration in Eastern Slavonia and with UNMIK as Political Reporting Officer). He has spent 16 years in Europe on both civilian and military assignments, among them as an international relations analyst at HQ U.S. Army Europe in the critical years of transformation between 1989 and 1993. In more recent years, he has been a consultant associated with DynCorp International, Creative Associates, the Institute for Defense Analyses, and the Naval Postgraduate School's Center for Civil-Military Relations. Among his chief accomplishments, with the NPS-CCMR, has been the development of CIMIC capabilities and programs in a number of NATO Partnership and other Security Assistance countries. He is currently a Senior Associate with the Project on National Security Reform. A graduate of the resident U.S. Army War College, Executive Director of the Cornwallis Group, a director in the Civil Affairs Association, and an adjunct faculty member of George Mason University, he has written extensively on civil-military and interagency stability and peace operations, information operations, and interdisciplinary training and education.
Lessons of Iraq and Afghanistan - Looking from Outside the Box
The American-led interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan, have no doubt brought on greater civil-military and whole-of-government approaches. However, this rising complexity and collaboration in international interventions already has whole-of-society and even whole-of-world dimensions in the world outside the box of Iraq and Afghanistan, which does not loom as large as an international problem set as in Washington. There are a number of considerations, but above all the context for such engagements is vastly different. This is paramount for American policymakers and practitioners looking to transfer "lessons" beyond Iraq and Afghanistan. "Winning hearts and minds" and PRTs for example, have much more limited application in places like the Horn of Africa and the Congo. And there may be as much - if not more - to learn from the current transition-to-peace effort in Liberia with respect to Afghanistan than the other way around.
Among the considerations shaping the differing strategic contexts:
Additionally, as the U.S transitions from a "military mission to a civilian-led effort" in Iraq and prepares to undergo a similar conversion in Afghanistan, it may be helpful to examine the transition from military-intensive post-conflict peacekeeping to civilian-led peace building with the aim of preventing a return to conflict in a major multinational intervention in Africa led by the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), perhaps the most integrative of UN field missions. Equally important is the role of the U.S. Country Team in Liberia, which is not only working collaboratively with the Government of Liberia and UNMIL to enhance their goals common to U.S. national interests, especially security sector reform, but also with those of international partners to include China in fostering civil society and economic development.
Finally, how we understand the contextualization of security interventions in the larger world beyond Iraq and Afghanistan will not only have profound and far-reaching implications for U.S. whole-of-government engagements at the theater, operational, and tactical levels in other places abroad. It could also help us re-shape our approach to national security writ large back at home.
Dr. Gregory P. Meyjes is Chair of the Department of Inclusive Education at Kennesaw State University, and President of Solidaris Intercultural Services LLC, an intercultural and international consulting firm with a focus on language, religion, and race/ethnicity. Along with a doctorate in Linguistics from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, NC (USA), Greg Meyjes holds graduate credentials in Political Science, Socio- and Applied Linguistics, and International Relations from the Universities of Heidelberg (Germany), Lancaster, Oxford, Essex (UK), and the Netherlands Universities Foundation for International Cooperation (NL), respectively.
Besides engagements as managing editor of a French journal (1980-1981,) rural literacy administrator (1986-1988,) global development researcher (1988-1989), post-doctoral Fellow at Harvard's Kennedy School of Government (1995), and public information director of a national non-profit in Washington DC (2001-2002,) Greg spent much of his academic career as Professor of foreign languages at North Carolina State University (1990-2001), as Fulbright Lecturer/Researcher in Sociolinguistics at the University of Conakry in Guinea, West Africa (1998-2000), and as Visiting Professor for Intercultural Education and Internationalization at Middle Tennessee State University (2007-2008).
As a world citizen who has lived in many countries and speaks, reads, and writes multiple languages with near-equal fluency, he has taught and/or researched at institutions in the US, the Caribbean, Africa, India, and Iran. With an interdisciplinary, cultural-rights-based approach to public policy and social change, his contributions focus on the cultural dimension of establishing a just and sustainable social order -- through consulting, teaching, translation/interpreting, community-based development and training, public information, and global research, including in United-Nations context. His primary research focus is on inclusionary practices that effective balance cultural difference with cultural disparity, in the interests of nation-building, international relations, and intercultural understanding. This includes a focus on interethnic conflict and post-conflict settings, as reflected, for instance, in his essay, "Plan "C" is for Culture: out of Iraq - Opportunity, Landpower Essay 07-4, Association of the United States Army, USA, (2007).
Intercultural Competence in Ethnic Conflict Prevention and Resolution: No Beginning in Sight?
That recent conflicts in the Middle East and Central Asia have been resource-, time-, and manpower-intensive to the United States is a considerable understatement. This presentation, however, is not primarily focused on such media questions as to whether the war in Afghanistan or in Vietnam is the US' longest, whether local forces will take control of Afghan security by 2014, or whether Pakistan's north/northwestern provinces ̶̶ like East Bengal, Southern Sudan, Northern Cyprus ̶̶ will risk secession on ethno-cultural grounds. Instead, the tensions and conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan ̶ and the US-led efforts to mitigate them ̶ are analyzed from the perspective of intercultural competency. Defined in relation to such concepts as tribalism, nationalism, cultural competence, and nation-building, an intercultural competency framework is presented that contrasts with traditional PSYOPS, diplomatic, and bi- and multi-lateral efforts. Its application to military interventions narrowly defined and to broader whole-of-government approaches is weighed. Consequently, a new three-tiered framework emerges that simultaneously outlines appropriate minority cultural rights, effective central-government policies, and realistic international actions to mitigate conflict among ethnic minority groups in the new world order. In conclusion, a summary is offered of a) why intercultural competence is a sine qua non for confronting multiethnic tensions in the region and beyond, b) what, in essence, it entails in terms of process and content, and c) how to achieve, promote, and sustain it through education, training, and policy.